



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

**Top Secret**



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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Friday  
11 December 1981***

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
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
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## USSR-POLAND: Soviets Call for Firmness

*In its strongest language in months, Moscow has signaled deep concern over developments in Poland and implied that the regime must not back away from firm action.* [redacted]

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A TASS commentary yesterday alluded to "demagogical demands" that Poland withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and alleged that threats have been made against Soviet lines of communication across Poland--one of Moscow's most sensitive concerns throughout the crisis. [redacted]

The commentary accused Solidarity of seeking to overthrow the executive and legislative branches of the Polish Government. It claimed that local Solidarity organizations are setting up "commando units" in Polish factories and that weapons have been stolen from government storage areas. [redacted]

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TASS also claimed that there has been an increase in activity within the Polish Catholic Church aimed at discrediting the government. Soviet criticism of the church has been rare, and in this instance doubtless reflects unhappiness over Archbishop Glemp's role in securing postponement of antistrike legislation. [redacted]

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The commentary stopped short of calling explicitly for stronger action by the regime, and the message has yet to be repeated by more authoritative Soviet organs. Nonetheless, the commentary is an indication that the Soviets at least for now are more concerned over the possibility of Warsaw taking too weak a stance than over the danger of a confrontation getting out of hand. [redacted]

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USSR - MIDDLE EAST: Diplomatic Activity

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*Moscow is trying to ensure a Soviet role in any new Arab-Israeli negotiations.* [redacted]

Ambassador at Large Sytenko, a Middle East expert in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has visited Syria, South Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon during the past four weeks. He apparently assessed Arab attitudes toward negotiations and promoted the Soviet proposal for an international conference on the Middle East. [redacted]

Sytenko's mission probably was intended to balance the activities of Ambassador Habib and undercut any US effort to establish contacts with hardline Arabs, especially the PLO. [redacted]

The collapse of the Arab summit in Fez evidently has further encouraged the Soviets to push their own proposal. [redacted]

Moscow probably believes that the best way to guarantee a Soviet role in any new negotiations is to encourage formation of a coalition of Arab states willing to participate in a new negotiating approach and to align itself closely with that initiative. The Soviets apparently think that this might have some appeal to Egypt and could isolate the US. [redacted]

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LEBANON: Tougher Phalange Position

*Phalange militia chief Bashir Jumayyil, with an eye toward the presidential election next summer, appears to be adopting a more confrontational stance toward the Syrians.*

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Jumayyil, in a speech last week marking the anniversary of the Christian Phalange Party, renewed his demand for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon before the election. He called on the Arab Conciliation Committee, which is scheduled to meet again in mid-January, to implement and oversee the withdrawal.

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Jumayyil hopes that a tougher strategy will diminish Syrian leverage in Lebanon and prevent Damascus from imposing its own presidential candidate. He probably is counting on US and Israeli support to bail him out of any new fighting.

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USSR-CHAD: Soviet Concerns

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*The Soviets appear concerned that the Libyan withdrawal from Chad could result in a renewal of Western influence there.* [redacted]

Foreign Minister Gromyko met with a Chadian emissary on Tuesday. This is the first such high-level meeting since Libya's military intervention and may indicate Moscow's interest in increasing bilateral ties. [redacted] 25X1

The meeting also seemed designed to underscore Soviet interest in a continuation of President Goukouni's feeble coalition regime and may have been intended to emphasize opposition to pro-Western rebel leader Habre. Gromyko publicly called for a quick end to the struggle in Chad on the basis of the "inadmissability" of external interference in its affairs. [redacted] 25X1

Moscow last spring endorsed Tripoli's intervention in Chad and has appeared increasingly pessimistic over the prospects for leftist rule there since the beginning of the Libyan pullout in November. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official recently commented [redacted] on Libya's "positive role" in Chad over the past few months and expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the OAU's peacekeeping forces. [redacted] 25X1

The Soviet official also claimed that the US had increased its assistance to Habre through Sudan and said that this was a "disturbing sign" of the extension of US influence in central Africa. Soviet media, moreover, have alleged that the US intends to install its own "puppet" in Chad. [redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL: Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone

[REDACTED]

Sofia's pursuit of this initiative may reflect a Soviet desire to exploit Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's support for such a zone. The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers endorsed the initiative in their communique last week. [REDACTED]

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Romania has been a longtime advocate of a Balkan nuclear-free zone and will cooperate, while Albania is not expected to participate. Yugoslavia is skeptical of the Bulgarian initiative and believes it would be viable only as part of an arms reduction package including conventional arms and extending beyond the Balkans. [REDACTED]

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The initiative is timed to capitalize on the advent of a Socialist government in Athens. Prime Minister Papandreou welcomes the Balkan nuclear-weapons-free concept, stating that he is willing to promote regional negotiations and, if necessary, to remove nuclear weapons from Greece unilaterally. He may have taken these positions, however, primarily to secure greater military assistance from NATO and a security guarantee against Turkey. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Nevertheless, Turkey will softpedal official rejection of the proposal so as to minimize damage to its relations with other states in the region. It may, however, attempt in NATO and other West European forums to use its opposition to the zone as another example of how much closer it is to Western security policies than is Greece. [REDACTED]

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PORTUGAL: Constitutional Changes Sought

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*Tension is rising as the government pursues constitutional revisions designed to limit the role of the president and place the military under parliamentary control.*

The ruling center-right Democratic Alliance is trying to eliminate the military's Revolutionary Council, which has a constitutional role in political decision-making. Prospects for securing the required two-thirds majority to amend the constitution are fairly good, because the Alliance appears to have the support of Socialist opposition leader Soares.

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The Alliance and the Socialists, however, are opposed by the Communist Party, by leftists in the Revolutionary Council, and by President Eanes. The Communists worry that eliminating the Council will remove an important check on the conservative government, and some Council members are threatening a military "reaction" if the military is subordinated to civilian authority. Eanes would lose much of his authority and his considerable control over the military.

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Adding to the highly charged atmosphere is the publication of a draft decree, written by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Melo Egidio. The decree would give operational command of the services to the chief of staff, who would answer only to the president. Prime Minister Balsemao charges that the draft is an attempt by Eanes to strengthen his hold over the military and to establish a political movement.

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Meanwhile, the Communist Party has called for a massive demonstration tomorrow to protest the proposed revisions, the government's economic austerity measures, and deployment of nuclear arms in Europe. The introduction of the nuclear issue probably reflects Soviet influence. The government is concerned that the Communists will try to create enough labor unrest to force Eanes to dismiss parliament and call new elections or at least divert attention from the constitutional revision process.

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MALTA: A Close Election

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*Prime Minister Dom Mintoff and his ruling Labor Party face a formidable challenge in the parliamentary election tomorrow.*

Mintoff's campaign has been gathering steam, but Nationalist leader Fenech-Adami's well-financed and smooth-running campaign is making Labor nervous. Labor remembers the tight race in 1976, when the Nationalists conducted a far less aggressive campaign. That election gave Mintoff a slight majority, and the swing of a small number of votes this time could result in his ouster.

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The Nationalist Party is charging that Mintoff has arrogated substantial powers to himself and his immediate circle. It claims this has caused a rise in corruption and inefficiency in government, a sagging economy, and a dangerous foreign policy.

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Mintoff, who still has strong appeal, touts his success at redistributing wealth in a historically elite-dominated society. The Prime Minister criticizes the Nationalists' call for full membership in the EC. He is pushing his version of "strict nonalignment."

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## USSR-US: Seeking Grain Talks

 Moscow is dissatisfied with the current one-year extension of the previous Long-Term Grain Agreement and believes that the US is not giving serious attention to its grain trade with the USSR. The Soviets want to resume talks on a new agreement as soon as possible, admitting that they are in a tight position because they need a large amount of grain. A possible decline in the availability of grain from Argentina this year may be adding to Moscow's anxiety.

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LIBERIA: Doe's Problems

Mounting frustrations reportedly are causing Head of State Doe to consider speeding up the promised return to civilian rule, a move that could lead to splits in his military power base. Doe is discouraged by the inability of the unsophisticated ruling military council to deal with economic problems and by the decline in the 20-month-old regime's popularity. He appears resolved to call for a new constitution, hold national elections, and install a civilian government within 12 to 18 months. Many council members accustomed to the perquisites of office, however, could forcibly resist an effort by Doe to return the Army to the barracks.

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
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